The government released the Super System Review panel’s final report on 5 July 2010.
The final report (commonly referred to as the Cooper Review report) is in two parts totalling approximately 500 pages and includes comprehensive recommendations in a broad range of areas encompassing:
In all, the Cooper Review panel made 177 recommendations across 10 broad categories. In this Bulletin, we examine some of the key final recommendations relating to large APRA-regulated funds (that is, funds with more than five members) and provide comments on some areas of interest.
It is important to note that these proposals remain recommendations only. The government has not yet released its response to the proposals, although that response is expected to be released gradually over the next month or so. Many of the proposals will require legislative change and so — particularly in an election year — the response of the federal opposition will also be important. There will also need to be considerable industry review and consultation on much of the detail in the recommendations and the government’s response, as well as the actual implementation. The panel itself contemplates a minimum two year transition period to the start of the new regime, and suggests 2014 as an appropriate start date for default funds to have to be MySuper funds.
At the heart of the recommendations are the “Choice architecture” and “MySuper” concepts which the review panel foreshadowed in its “MySuper” preliminary report released in April 2010. The panel has divided members into three main classes:
The eligible rollover fund and lost member sector is identified as a separate class of members, although the panel has expressed the hope that this sector would not continue as a material part of the super system if the SuperStream recommendations (discussed further below) are implemented.
The panel recommended that only a MySuper product should be eligible to be a default fund under the superannuation guarantee (SG) legislation. Further, only MySuper products should be eligible to be nominated for default fund purposes in awards approved by Fair Work Australia.
As foreshadowed in the MySuper preliminary report, MySuper products would have to satisfy a range of objective criteria, including the following:
Trustees of MySuper products would have to operate under new high level principles-based duties. The report specifically states that there is no reason why any industry sector should be excluded from offering MySuper products.
The panel considers that conversion of an existing fund to a MySuper product should not be a costly exercise and contemplates that the scheduled review of modern awards in 2014 could be an appropriate start date for MySuper products to become defaults for SG purposes.
We believe the MySuper vision should be familiar to most superannuation funds and they should be able to convert to a combined MySuper/Choice fund from their existing structures. We do have concerns regarding some of the panel’s recommendations, including aspects of the scale test which seems to have no regard to any cost subsidies that may be provided by sponsoring employers. We still believe the industry can develop a cost effective way of including the age pension in retirement benefit projections. For most people, not including the age pension will materially underestimate their potential retirement income, which could cause them to make poor decisions.
We hope the strong focus on reducing costs does not discourage funds from investing in higher cost investment vehicles that can provide members with significant diversification benefits. It would be disappointing if an unintended consequence of MySuper was to stifle innovation and discourage trustees from seeking the best risk adjusted investment returns for their members. We strongly support a lengthy transition period, to enable funds to minimise transition costs which will ultimately be borne by the current generation of fund members.
Choice products represent the next level of engagement by members. As noted above, a Choice product could be offered by a MySuper trustee within the same fund and accessing the same administration and investment vehicles, although members, and costs, would need to be separately identified. Trustees of Choice products would generally be able to determine the extent to which they were different from MySuper products in terms of investment choices or retirement products. However, some requirements are recommended in relation to Choice products:
Another key batch of recommendations relate to the “SuperStream” concept which was also the subject of a preliminary report. SuperStream is the name given to the panel’s proposals to modernise the “back office” of superannuation. The components of SuperStream include:
The panel estimated that annual savings of up to $1 billion are achievable from the SuperStream reforms. Specific recommendations include the following:
In our view, SuperStream will deliver a much more efficient superannuation system with more effective use of technology. Getting employers and fund administrators up to speed will require significant time, skilled resources and an initial cost, but for greater benefit in the long term.
The panel noted that due to the special purpose of superannuation and the public policy goal of enhancing the retirement incomes of members, everyone involved in the superannuation system needs to have and be seen to have high standards of governance. While the panel acknowledged that there is no evidence of systemic failure of trustee governance in the superannuation system, they believe there are shortcomings that need to be addressed and improvements that can be made.
In total, twenty recommendations were made by the panel in relation to governance. Major proposals include the following:
We broadly support many of the measures proposed, and indeed, many reflect recommendations made in our submissions. We believe, though, that the equal representation model has served corporate and industry superannuation funds well, and are not convinced that the proposed non-associated directors model would be similarly successful for such funds, or whether the cost of professional non-associated directors would be reasonable compared to the value they might add. We note with some surprise the panel’s comment in support of this measure that equal representation leaves many members unrepresented, as the majority of corporate and industry funds now include groups such as pensioners and retained members in the equal representation process.
Capital adequacy and liquidity were key elements identified by the panel as ensuring the stability of the superannuation system and the security of members’ benefits. Liquidity issues may not only impact on day to day operations such as investment switching and portability transfers, they can also lead to loss of confidence in the system. However, illiquid assets may have attractive features as an investment option. The panel also identified that the increased size of funds, while delivering economies of scale, tends to concentrate risk.
Accordingly, the panel recommended new capital requirements for trustees (on a risk-weighted basis) be introduced over time, with trust deeds deemed to include provisions enabling trustees to maintain dedicated operational risk reserves. Legislation would define both a minimum dollar risk reserve and a maximum reserve as a percentage of fund assets, and APRA would have the power to increase the minimum level of the reserve required by a particular fund if it assessed it as necessary. Both the minimum and maximum would be developed in consultation with the industry. Risk factors which would be taken into account include the level of indemnity insurance held by the trustee and the extent to which service providers have their own insurance. The panel noted that the capital proposals should be neutral between different industry sectors and phased in over time to avoid imposing an undue burden on current members.
In relation to liquidity, the panel recommended that Risk Management Plans (RMPs) should explicitly include a liquidity management component, to ensure trustees identify and manage risk at both a fund and investment option level. The RMP should have particular regard to the liquidity of options offered to members in the retirement phase. It also recommended that the exception in the portability rules relating to illiquid assets be maintained for Choice products, but that members’ consent should no longer be required provided there is adequate disclosure before a member selects an illiquid investment option.
We support these measures as a means of enhancing the security of members’ benefits and public confidence in the superannuation system. In our view, the capital requirements would be best met via reserves within a fund, rather than capital held by the trustee external to the fund. We would encourage APRA to consider the use of tools such as such as an appropriate form of financial condition report, consistent with the regulation of other significant financial institutions, as part of its prudential risk management framework.
One of the key issues acknowledged by the panel was that poor investment governance puts a fund’s goals at risk. Complex investment manager fee arrangements, potential conflicts between investment managers and members’ interests and the different variety of investment structures within the superannuation industry lead to a lack of transparency for members.
Some of the key recommendations from the panel include:
We believe the recommendations made will enhance the investment governance of superannuation funds and look forward to the industry consultation in developing the performance-based fee standard to be prepared by APRA.
Defined benefit funds are acknowledged as having served members well over a long period, because they provide greater certainty about the amount of members’ retirement benefits and because members do not bear investment risk, which enables such funds to invest for the long term.
The panel noted that defined benefit members are not subject to the same concerns about fees, or issues over the appropriateness of asset allocations, as accumulation members. Accordingly, the panel recommended that where the defined benefit is used for SG compliance, this fund (or section of a hybrid fund) will automatically qualify as a default fund. Such a fund would not need to meet the MySuper criteria.
The panel commented in some depth on the protection of members’ benefits in defined benefit funds. The panel recognised that the financial strength of each sponsoring employer is different and that a balance needed to be struck between protecting members’ benefits, avoiding the creation of large surpluses, and avoiding placing employers under too much financial pressure. Ultimately, and in line with the view put in Towers Watson’s submissions, the panel decided that member protection should focus on vested benefits rather than SG minimum benefits. Accordingly, the panel recommended that APRA issue a prudential standard focusing on the protection of vested benefits in defined benefit funds.
Other recommendations in relation to defined benefit funds include the following:
Finally, the panel encouraged policy makers to have regard to the complexities that are created in defined benefit funds through regulatory changes that are designed primarily for accumulation funds. The panel felt it important that the costs in respect of these funds not be unnecessarily increased.
It is very pleasing to see that the Review panel has recognised the continuing importance of defined benefit funds and we commend the panel for its recommendations in relation to these funds.
The panel noted the importance of insurance inside superannuation, especially given the small number of individuals who have any personal insurance cover outside their superannuation. Accordingly, the panel considered that trustees of funds which provide insurance (MySuper or otherwise) should have a statutory duty to manage their fund’s insurance with the sole aim of benefiting members, similar to their role in investing fund assets.
Many of the recommendations made in relation to insurance have been considered elsewhere in this Bulletin. Others worthy of note include the following:
We support measures to improve members’ understanding and appreciation of the insurance benefits provided to them. Plain English explanations of policy terms will need careful drafting to ensure that any differences from the exact policy terms do not expose trustees to uninsured claims. While the recommendations on binding nominations will reduce the possibility of inequitable outcomes, they will also extend the time taken to pay death benefits as enquiries will need to be made regarding any relevant changes in the deceased member’s circumstances.
Ultimately superannuation is savings for retirement. Yet the chapter entitled “Retirement” contains less recommendations than any other section of the report.
The panel recommends MySuper be an integrated retirement product, by requiring it to include one type of income stream product either through the fund or in conjunction with another provider. Trustees of MySuper products would be required to proactively offer intra-fund advice to members both as they approach retirement and in the retirement phase.
More than 50% of a person’s income in retirement will be sourced from post-retirement investment earnings. Trustees would therefore be required to devise a separate investment strategy for post-retirement members in MySuper products, which has regard to issues such as inflation and longevity risk.
In our view, post-retirement remains the great challenge that has yet to be addressed effectively by the industry. The Henry review acknowledged that a structural weakness in the current system is a failure to provide products that enable a person to manage longevity risk. Insurance companies have already started to innovate in this area with a few “next generation” annuity style products being launched in the past twelve months. The question now is how funds will develop their own longevity pooling products, on their own or in partnership with others. Either way, the biggest challenge will be to convince members that this is a real problem and that an annuity style product can play an important role in managing their retirement risks.
A number of the panel’s recommendations are aimed at improving the transparency of superannuation. The panel believes it is essential that members be given information that is simpler, forward looking and standardised to assist in making comparisons, and that much disclosure needs to be directed to member proxies such as advisers, regulators, researchers and analysts to enhance competition between funds and sectors. Targeted regulation has been identified as the solution to this issue. Accordingly, the panel has recommended a range of initiatives, some of which are summarised below.
We are supportive of improvements in the transparency of superannuation and endorse the establishment of a central government website about superannuation, which would simplify standard disclosure to members. Standardised measures of risk and return, as well as standardised labels for investment options, are also long overdue. It is also pleasing that the panel has moved away from the idea — published in a preliminary report — of separate financial statements and audits for MySuper and Choice sections of funds. However, there is potential for concern with the detail of some of these measures, particularly in relation to employer sponsored funds which are not open to the public. It is also unclear how these measures will apply to defined benefit funds.
For further information please contact your Towers Watson Consultant or Actuary:
Melbourne 03 9655 5222
Sydney 02 9253 3333
The information in this publication is general information only and does not take into account your particular objectives, financial circumstances or needs. It is not personal advice. You should consider obtaining professional advice about your particular circumstances before making any financial or investment decisions based on the information contained in this document.
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